Unnameable Media

Mao, Yale and the American Establishment

Part 25 of 31 in The Classified Desk

On February 21, 1972, Richard Nixon entered the private residence of Mao Zedong in Beijing. For more than twenty years, the governments represented by these two men had regarded each other as enemies. American and Chinese soldiers had fought on the Korean Peninsula, Washington had armed the Nationalist government in Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party had organized an entire generation around resistance to American imperialism. Yet here was the Republican president of the United States, sitting among the books and papers of the most powerful Communist revolutionary in Asia.

According to Mao’s personal physician, Dr. Li Zhisui, the chairman made a particularly revealing observation about the relationship the two countries were about to establish. Recalling the encounter years later in the documentary The Mao Years, Li attributed to Mao the remark:

We will still have to curse you a little in our newspapers. Calling you American imperialists, you can also curse us a bit.

The remark does not appear in the declassified American memorandum of the meeting, but it is consistent with Mao’s documented conversations with American officials. The chairman understood the difficulties involved in reconciling decades of revolutionary propaganda with his government’s changing international relationships. Millions of Chinese citizens had been educated to regard the United States as the principal enemy of their revolution. The political accommodation being negotiated in Beijing would require a considerable adjustment in public thinking.

During the meeting, Mao openly expressed his preference for dealing with right-wing political leaders. He knew Nixon’s history as an anti-Communist and appeared to regard it as an advantage. Nixon understood the irony just as well. His reputation gave him the political latitude to undertake an initiative that might have destroyed the career of a Democratic president.

The significance of the encounter extended well beyond the diplomatic recognition of Communist China. Within days of Nixon’s arrival, Henry Kissinger was privately sharing highly classified American intelligence with the Chinese military concerning Soviet forces positioned along China’s frontiers. Within eighteen months, David Rockefeller had traveled to Beijing and secured a banking relationship between Chase Manhattan and the Bank of China. American and Western industrial technology was entering the country on a scale unparalleled since the early years of Soviet assistance.

To understand how this accommodation came about, however, it is necessary to return to an earlier period in Mao’s life, when the future chairman was a young political organizer occupying property belonging to an American educational institution in the provincial capital of Hunan.

Nina Gage, first dean of the Xiangya School of Nursing, in the courtyard of the Yale-China clinic in Changsha.
Nina Gage, first dean of the Xiangya School of Nursing, in the courtyard of the Yale-China clinic in Changsha. China Hands

In February 1901, a group of Yale graduates established an organization intended to extend American educational and medical influence into China. Initially known as the Yale Mission, it eventually became Yale-in-China, establishing its principal operations in Changsha, a city that would produce some of the most important personalities of the Chinese Communist revolution.

China was then emerging from the Boxer Rebellion. Foreign governments had imposed enormous financial burdens upon the Qing Empire, resentment toward Western interference was widespread, and Chinese intellectuals were beginning to question the political and philosophical traditions that had governed their country for centuries. The collapse of the imperial system was only a decade away.

The Yale organization approached China through education, science and medicine. Its graduates established schools, trained physicians and introduced Western educational practices. Among its principal personalities was Dr. Edward Hume, a Yale graduate who worked with the American-trained Chinese physician Yan Fuqing to develop what became the Xiangya medical complex. The name itself combined references to Hunan and Yale.

Historic Xiangya Hospital building, Changsha.
Historic Xiangya Hospital building, Changsha. Hunan Today

These institutions became part of the intellectual life of Changsha. Their classrooms, meeting spaces and publications brought Chinese students into contact with currents of Western political and scientific thought. They also existed within a city increasingly animated by nationalism, republicanism, socialism and opposition to the authority of China’s remaining traditional institutions. One of the young men moving through that environment was Mao Zedong.

In 1919, having returned from Beijing, where he had worked at the library of Peking University, Mao rented space in a building formerly occupied by Yale-in-China’s medical clinic. His experiences in Beijing had introduced him to the intellectual world surrounding the New Culture Movement and the writings of Li Dazhao, one of the earliest important advocates of Marxism in China.

Mao Zedong in Changsha, April 1919.
Mao Zedong in Changsha, April 1919. Wikimedia Commons

Mao began publishing a journal called the Xiang River Review, using it to criticize the government of Hunan and advocate political change. When the provincial authorities suppressed the publication, he became editor of New Hunan, a journal associated with the students of Xiangya Medical College.

The inaugural issue of Mao’s Xiang River Review, July 14, 1919.
The inaugural issue of Mao’s Xiang River Review, July 14, 1919. Shanghai International Studies University

Mao’s ability to secure premises and access publishing infrastructure came at a critical point in his development as a political organizer. In 1920, he established the Cultural Book Society, whose bookstore operated from property rented from Xiangya. It distributed Chinese and foreign publications, including works on political and social reform, and eventually developed a regional network of outlets throughout Hunan. By the following year, Mao was one of the delegates attending the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai.

The relationship is acknowledged in a 2021 historical article published by Yale’s undergraduate magazine on American-Chinese relations. Its account also records the growing concern of the Yale-in-China administration over Mao’s revolutionary activities by 1925. The surviving evidence establishes a connection to the institution while stopping short of demonstrating that Mao was recruited or directed by its American leadership.

What makes Yale’s presence in China particularly interesting is the much older history of the New England families whose wealth and international associations helped shape the university’s culture.

The foreign trading establishments of Canton, depicted in a nineteenth-century painting.
The foreign trading establishments of Canton, depicted in a nineteenth-century painting. Aeon, historical illustration

In the early nineteenth century, long before the United States developed a significant diplomatic or military presence in East Asia, American merchant families had established themselves in the Chinese commercial system. The China trade generated enormous private fortunes, connecting Boston, New York, Connecticut and Philadelphia to Canton through networks of shipping companies, merchant banks, insurance houses and foreign commercial agents.

Among the most important of these enterprises was Russell & Company, established by Samuel Russell of Middletown, Connecticut. Following its merger with the China trading interests of Perkins & Company in 1831, the firm emerged as the largest American commission merchant house operating in China.

Its surviving business records, held by Harvard and the Library of Congress, document an extensive trade involving Turkish opium, international currency transactions, shipping and commercial interests extending across Europe and Asia. American merchants purchased opium through the Mediterranean trade and introduced it into Chinese markets, where the profits could be applied toward purchases of tea, silk and other Chinese commodities destined for Western consumers.

The business contributed to the fortunes of numerous prominent Americans, including Warren Delano, the maternal grandfather of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Other merchants associated with the enterprise included members of the Forbes family, whose wealth and interests subsequently extended into American railroads and industrial development. The Russell correspondence also includes figures such as John Jacob Astor and the international banking house of Baring Brothers.

American participation in the opium trade is frequently overshadowed by the more familiar history of the British East India Company and the Opium Wars. Yet the accumulation of commercial wealth through China played an important role in the formation of the nineteenth-century American financial establishment.

In 1832, the year following the Perkins merger, another member of the Russell family, William Huntington Russell, helped establish a secret society at Yale University with Alphonso Taft, the future United States attorney general and father of President William Howard Taft. The society became known as Skull and Bones.

The Skull and Bones Tomb on High Street, New Haven.
The Skull and Bones Tomb on High Street, New Haven. Wikimedia Commons

The Russell Trust Association, the corporate organization associated with the society, would become one of the more enduring private institutions in American university life. Its membership eventually included men who occupied prominent positions in American government, banking, industry, diplomacy and intelligence.

The relationship between the Russell family fortune, the China trade and Skull and Bones has been the subject of historical speculation for generations. In 2015, the Yale Alumni Magazine published correspondence discussing historian James Bradley’s examination of these connections. The exact movement of opium-derived wealth into the society’s early finances remains less firmly documented than the commercial activities of Russell & Company itself.

What can be established, however, is that the commercial relationship with China and the formation of one of America’s most influential collegiate secret societies emerged from overlapping circles of New England wealth during the same historical period. More than a century later, members of that society would occupy important places in the diplomatic reconstruction of America’s relationship with China.

By then, the American presence in the country had moved well beyond the merchant establishments of Canton. The missionaries, universities, foundations and medical institutions that followed the merchants introduced another form of international influence, involving the organization of knowledge, the education of future administrators and the development of professional classes in a country undergoing political disintegration. Among the most ambitious of these undertakings was the Rockefeller family’s medical development program.

John D. Rockefeller Jr. and other guests at the dedication of Peking Union Medical College, 1921.
John D. Rockefeller Jr. and other guests at the dedication of Peking Union Medical College, 1921. Bernard Becker Medical Library, Washington University

In 1914, the Rockefeller Foundation established the China Medical Board. The following year it acquired an existing missionary medical college in Beijing and began transforming the institution into one of the most sophisticated centers of medical education in Asia.

The resulting Peking Union Medical College was an extraordinary architectural and institutional enterprise. Constructed in traditional Chinese architectural forms, with elaborate tiled roofs and courtyards, the complex housed modern laboratories, classrooms, operating rooms and research facilities. John D. Rockefeller Jr. traveled to China for its dedication in 1921, the same year that Mao and his fellow revolutionaries established the Chinese Communist Party.

The opening ceremonies at Peking Union Medical College in 1921.
The opening ceremonies at Peking Union Medical College in 1921. China Christian Daily

Between 1915 and 1951, the Rockefeller Foundation and the China Medical Board spent tens of millions of dollars on Chinese medical development, most of it directed toward Peking Union Medical College. The commitment eventually extended into agricultural development, education, social sciences and the organization of rural communities. In 1935, the foundation initiated an ambitious rural reconstruction program, working with Chinese educators and reformers concerned with literacy, agricultural productivity, public health and village administration.

An important figure in this development was James Yen, the Chinese educator whose Mass Education Movement undertook a broad experiment in rural modernization. Yen’s work attracted the attention of Rockefeller Foundation administrator Selskar Gunn, who envisioned a coordinated program involving universities, agriculture, medicine and local government. The foundation helped organize the North China Council for Rural Reconstruction, bringing academic departments into direct contact with the problems of China’s rural population.

An agricultural demonstration site near Nanking, 1935, from the Rockefeller Foundation’s China program.
An agricultural demonstration site near Nanking, 1935, from the Rockefeller Foundation’s China program. Rockefeller Archive Center

The Rockefeller program and Mao’s revolutionary movement represented very different solutions to the same underlying crisis. Both confronted the enormous gulf between the political and intellectual life of China’s cities and the conditions in which its rural population lived. Both recognized that the country’s future depended upon the organization and transformation of village life. The American foundations sought reform through education, medicine and agricultural development. Mao sought power through land redistribution, revolutionary political organization and armed struggle.

Their activities were not part of a demonstrated common program. Nevertheless, the simultaneous American interest in rural reconstruction and the emergence of a revolutionary movement founded upon the Chinese peasantry constitutes an important historical convergence. The countryside that Rockefeller administrators regarded as the foundation of China’s modernization was also the countryside from which Mao intended to raise his armies.

By the late 1930s, the growing Japanese occupation of China would bring those armies into direct contact with American military intelligence.

Mao Zedong in 1936, photographed by Edgar Snow during his visit to Communist territory.
Mao Zedong in 1936, photographed by Edgar Snow during his visit to Communist territory. Wikimedia Commons

The American public’s introduction to Mao owed much to the journalist Edgar Snow, who traveled into Communist-controlled territory in 1936 and obtained unprecedented access to the revolutionary leadership. His interviews became the basis of Red Star Over China, published in 1937. The book presented Mao as a comparatively accessible revolutionary leader emerging from the social and political difficulties of modern China. Snow recorded the history of the Communist movement, the Long March and Mao’s personal development, supplying Western readers with an account substantially different from the denunciations circulating through Nationalist-controlled channels.

Other Americans followed. The journalist Agnes Smedley accompanied Communist forces during the fighting against Japan, while American Marine officer Evans Fordyce Carlson undertook a military examination of the guerrilla armies. Carlson’s experience is particularly important because the transfer of military knowledge during this period occurred in both directions. American observers were interested in understanding how Communist armies operated with comparatively little equipment, maintained internal discipline and developed relationships with rural populations.

American military observer Evans Fordyce Carlson with a Chinese soldier. Photograph by Robert Capa.
American military observer Evans Fordyce Carlson with a Chinese soldier. Photograph by Robert Capa. International Center of Photography

Carlson spent months studying the Communist Eighth Route Army. He was impressed by its mobility and political organization, and his subsequent command of the American Marine Raiders incorporated some of the organizational ideas he encountered in China. The phrase gung ho, which entered American military vocabulary through Carlson, came from the Chinese cooperative movement and became associated with his emphasis on collective effort.

These early military and journalistic contacts provided American officials with information about the Chinese Communist forces long before Washington established its wartime intelligence mission at Mao’s headquarters. They also helped create a community of American specialists whose understanding of China differed considerably from that of the officials committed to preserving Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government. By 1944, the disagreements between these groups had developed into one of the most consequential internal disputes in American wartime foreign policy.

Colonel David D. Barrett with Mao Zedong at Yan’an, 1944.
Colonel David D. Barrett with Mao Zedong at Yan’an, 1944. Barrett, Dixie Mission / Wikimedia Commons

On July 22, 1944, an American military aircraft landed at Yan’an, the remote headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party in northern Shaanxi. The personnel who arrived established what was officially known as the United States Army Observer Group. It became better known as the Dixie Mission.

The operation brought together military observers, Foreign Service officers and personnel associated with the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime intelligence organization established under William J. Donovan that became an institutional predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The American military was preparing for the final stages of the Pacific War. Intelligence concerning Japanese troop movements, weather conditions, industrial targets and occupied territory was becoming increasingly valuable. The Chinese Communist armies, operating throughout Japanese-occupied regions, possessed sources of information and local contacts that could not readily be accessed through Chiang Kai-shek’s government.

Among the Americans who arrived at Yan’an were Colonel David D. Barrett and Foreign Service officer John Stewart Service. OSS Captain John Colling, a specialist in demolitions and unconventional warfare, also served on the mission. They encountered a complex revolutionary administration. The Communist headquarters contained military academies, intelligence organizations, political education facilities and institutions devoted to propaganda, broadcasting and the administration of liberated territories.

Members of the American delegation with Chinese Communist leaders at Yan’an.
Members of the American delegation with Chinese Communist leaders at Yan’an. Historical photograph reproduced by iNEWS

Mao personally participated in briefing the Americans. Communist commanders explained their military organization, and the OSS personnel introduced American knowledge of irregular warfare and modern explosives. Colling subsequently operated alongside Chinese Communist troops in the field and received recognition from Zhou Enlai for his contribution. The mission also helped establish arrangements for collecting weather intelligence from Communist-controlled territory, useful to American air and naval operations.

One of the more unusual intelligence opportunities involved the Japanese prisoners held by the Communists. American observers discovered that some captured Japanese soldiers had undergone political education and become willing participants in anti-Japanese military and propaganda activities. The Japanese People’s Emancipation League, associated with Japanese Communist leader Sanzo Nosaka, maintained contacts that reached into Japanese-controlled territory and Japan itself. Colling recognized the intelligence possibilities of the organization. A classified initiative known as the Apple Project sought information on the psychological effects of American bombing on the Japanese population.

The experience also attracted American interest in Chinese Communist methods of political persuasion. An official CIA historical study published in 2019 discusses the observations of journalists and intelligence officers who encountered early forms of what would subsequently become widely known as brainwashing. The Americans had arrived to collect military information, but their encounter with Mao’s organization also gave them insight into the relationship between military effectiveness, political indoctrination and the transformation of personal loyalties.

Chinese generals and members of the Dixie Mission at Yan’an, 1944. Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, David Barrett, Zhu De and John Service are among the group.
Chinese generals and members of the Dixie Mission at Yan’an, 1944. Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, David Barrett, Zhu De and John Service are among the group. American Geographical Society Library, UWM

The cooperation potentially extended much further. On December 15, 1944, OSS Lieutenant Colonel Willis Bird and Colonel Barrett returned to Yan’an to discuss a substantial American military assistance program with the Communist leadership. Negotiations involved Red Army commander Zhu De and his chief of staff, General Ye Jianying.

The tentative agreement contemplated American equipment for as many as 25,000 Communist guerrillas, the supply of 100,000 single-shot pistols to the People’s Militia, instruction in American arms and communications, an intelligence radio network and the attachment of OSS special operations personnel to Chinese Communist units.

The proposed undertaking would have amounted to an extensive program of American support for Mao’s military organization during the final stages of the war. Its purpose was to attack Japanese forces, although any improvements in Communist military capabilities would inevitably have implications for the postwar struggle over China.

The full program was never implemented. Opposition within the American diplomatic and military establishment prevented it from proceeding on the contemplated scale. The operational cooperation that had already occurred at Yan’an, however, was real. The disagreements that followed reached the highest levels of the Roosevelt administration and prompted one of the more remarkable diplomatic proposals of Mao’s revolutionary career.

On January 9, 1945, Mao and Zhou Enlai transmitted a discreet message through American military channels expressing their willingness to travel to Washington to meet President Roosevelt. They proposed that the Chinese Communists be permitted to explain their position directly to American political leaders and civic organizations. If Roosevelt agreed to receive them, Mao and Zhou were prepared to undertake the journey themselves. They requested that their willingness to do so remain confidential if the meeting proved impossible.

It was a potentially revolutionary development in American foreign policy. The leader of the Chinese Communist movement was attempting to establish direct relations with the president of the United States while the Chinese Nationalists remained Washington’s recognized allies. Ambassador Patrick Hurley opposed the initiative, regarding the independent discussions between American military officers and the Communists as a threat to his policy of preserving Chiang Kai-shek’s government. In a subsequent report to Washington, Hurley explained that the Communists had interpreted the military proposals discussed by Barrett and Bird as an opportunity to obtain American recognition without going through the Nationalist authorities or the American ambassador.

Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. The proposed meeting never took place. Had it occurred, the celebrated encounter between an American president and Mao Zedong might have taken place in Washington twenty-seven years before Nixon arrived in Beijing.

Mao Zedong in 1945, the year of his economic discussions with John Service.
Mao Zedong in 1945, the year of his economic discussions with John Service. Wikimedia Commons

Two months before Roosevelt’s death, Mao had explained his economic thinking to John Service in a conversation at Yan’an. Service’s report, dated March 13, 1945, contains one of the most revealing passages in the entire history of American relations with the Chinese Communists.

Mao envisioned an extended period of Chinese economic development involving private enterprise, agricultural reform, foreign investment and the importation of advanced industrial machinery. He believed the United States possessed the capital and technical expertise necessary to transform China into a modern industrial society, while China could provide American industry with an enormous market and source of raw materials.

As Service summarized Mao’s position:

America and China complement each other economically: they will not compete.

Mao’s immediate revolutionary program, as presented to Service, was remarkably accommodating toward American capitalism. The Communist leader argued that China could not proceed directly into socialism because the country lacked the economic foundations necessary to sustain it. An extended period of regulated private enterprise would first be required.

The vision Mao expressed in 1945 bears a striking resemblance to the economic relationship eventually established between the United States and China during the final years of his life and expanded under Deng Xiaoping. American capital, machinery and consumer demand would become instrumental in Chinese industrial development. China would supply manufactured goods to foreign markets, while American corporations would gain access to a vast new commercial environment.

This economic conception was already circulating among the Chinese Communist leadership before the establishment of the People’s Republic. Indeed, Mao expressed it to an American diplomat while members of the OSS were still operating from his revolutionary headquarters. The theory that Mao was exclusively concerned with establishing an economically isolated Communist state consequently misses an important element of his early political strategy. His conception of the Chinese revolution accommodated different stages of development, each of which could involve different domestic and international alliances.

Whether Mao’s promises to the Americans were sincere, calculated to secure assistance, or some combination of both, the memorandum demonstrates that the possibility of American-supported Chinese industrialization had been entertained as early as 1945.

Mao and Chiang Kai-shek toast the defeat of Japan in Chongqing, September 1945.
Mao and Chiang Kai-shek toast the defeat of Japan in Chongqing, September 1945. Wikimedia Commons

The years following the Japanese surrender would temporarily destroy that possibility. The resumption of the Chinese Civil War placed the United States in an increasingly difficult position. Chiang Kai-shek’s government received substantial American assistance, while the Communists consolidated their control across northern China. Nationalist corruption, inflation, military defeats and declining popular support contributed to the collapse of Chiang’s position on the mainland.

The American officials who had advocated closer relations with Mao during World War II became the subjects of intense political scrutiny following the Communist victory in 1949. John Service was investigated and eventually dismissed from the State Department in 1951, before winning reinstatement through the Supreme Court. His experience became emblematic of the controversy surrounding the so-called China Hands, the community of American diplomats and specialists accused of having contributed to the Communist takeover.

The accusations of the McCarthy period frequently treated professional assessments of Chiang’s weaknesses and Mao’s strengths as evidence of disloyalty. Yet the records of the wartime intelligence mission demonstrate that the disagreements had often involved genuine differences over military strategy, Chinese political conditions and the future direction of American influence in Asia. There were Americans who believed that Washington should accommodate the Communist movement and others who regarded its destruction as essential to American interests. These competing positions existed within the same diplomatic and intelligence establishment.

Mao at Tiananmen during the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, October 1, 1949.
Mao at Tiananmen during the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, October 1, 1949. Wikimedia Commons

When Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the faction favoring accommodation lost the immediate argument. The following year, American and Chinese troops entered direct combat in Korea, transforming a diplomatic estrangement into a military conflict. The CIA subsequently became involved in covert operations supporting Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule. These included paramilitary assistance, intelligence collection and propaganda activities. The existence of such programs demonstrates that the antagonism between Washington and Beijing during the intervening decades was considerably more than a newspaper invention.

Chinese People’s Volunteer Army troops crossing the Yalu River during the Korean War.
Chinese People’s Volunteer Army troops crossing the Yalu River during the Korean War. 21st Century Business Herald, archival photograph

Nevertheless, the strategic relationship between the United States and Communist China would change again when Mao’s alliance with the Soviet Union began to disintegrate.

Mao and Joseph Stalin at the latter’s seventieth birthday celebration in Moscow, December 1949.
Mao and Joseph Stalin at the latter’s seventieth birthday celebration in Moscow, December 1949. Wikimedia Commons

The Soviet Union had provided the People’s Republic with substantial industrial and technical assistance during the 1950s. Its engineers and advisers participated in the construction of factories, steelworks, military facilities and other components of China’s emerging industrial economy.

The relationship deteriorated rapidly following Stalin’s death. Mao increasingly regarded Nikita Khrushchev’s policies as a betrayal of revolutionary principles, while Soviet officials became alarmed by Mao’s increasingly radical domestic and foreign policies. Territorial disputes and competition for leadership of the international Communist movement deepened the estrangement. By 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces were fighting along their disputed border.

For Mao, the Soviet Union had become a direct military threat. The country that had supplied the industrial foundations of Communist China now possessed the military capabilities to destroy much of what it had helped construct.

In that same year, Mao commissioned a strategic assessment from four of China’s senior marshals: Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen. Their examination of the international situation included the possibility of establishing relations with the United States as a means of counterbalancing Soviet power. Among them was Ye Jianying, the very same Chinese military commander who had participated in the OSS negotiations at Yan’an in December 1944.

Marshal Ye Jianying, 1955. He participated in the wartime OSS negotiations and the 1972 intelligence briefing.
Marshal Ye Jianying, 1955. He participated in the wartime OSS negotiations and the 1972 intelligence briefing. Wikimedia Commons

Twenty-five years after discussing American military assistance for Communist guerrillas, Ye was again involved in laying the foundations for a strategic accommodation with the United States. The American intelligence relationship established during World War II had acquired an unexpected contemporary relevance.

In September 1970, the American journalist Edgar Snow returned to China. His reappearance at Mao’s side provided another example of the reactivation of personal relationships originating during the revolutionary era. On October 1, Snow stood with Mao at Tiananmen during the National Day celebrations. The appearance of an American journalist beside the Chinese chairman was intended to convey a political message. An extensive interview followed in which Mao indicated his willingness to receive Nixon.

Edgar Snow and Mao at Tiananmen during China’s National Day celebrations, 1970.
Edgar Snow and Mao at Tiananmen during China’s National Day celebrations, 1970. ChinaFile

The journalist who had introduced Mao to Western audiences during the 1930s was now helping communicate the possibility of a new relationship between Mao and the American government.

In April 1971, the invitation extended to American table tennis players visiting China transformed this diplomatic maneuvering into a public spectacle. The episode became known as Ping-Pong Diplomacy, providing a comparatively innocent cultural explanation for an accommodation that was being developed through secret channels. While the international press covered table tennis matches and American tourists visiting the Chinese mainland, communications between Washington and Beijing were being arranged through Pakistan.

Members of the American table tennis delegation visit the Great Wall, 1971.
Members of the American table tennis delegation visit the Great Wall, 1971. The Beijinger, archival photograph

In July 1971, Henry Kissinger secretly departed Pakistan for Beijing, where he met Zhou Enlai and established the framework for Nixon’s presidential visit. One of the few Americans accompanying Kissinger was a thirty-three-year-old Yale graduate named Winston Lord.

Winston Lord shakes hands with Mao Zedong as Henry Kissinger looks on.
Winston Lord shakes hands with Mao Zedong as Henry Kissinger looks on. Sài Gòn Đầu Tư Tài Chính

Lord came from a prominent American family. His father, Oswald Bates Lord, was a businessman, while his mother, Mary Pillsbury Lord, served as an American representative to the United Nations. Through education and family associations, Winston Lord entered the social and institutional world from which much of America’s diplomatic establishment was recruited. At Yale, Lord belonged to Skull and Bones, following the example of his father. In his oral history preserved by the Library of Congress, Lord openly acknowledged his membership in the society.

Lord served as Kissinger’s special assistant and participated in some of the most sensitive diplomatic undertakings of the Nixon administration. His position afforded him access to relationships and discussions frequently withheld from the larger American foreign policy establishment. When Nixon met Mao on February 21, 1972, Winston Lord was in the room. His presence, however, was concealed in the photographs released to the American public.

Lord subsequently explained that he had been cropped out of the official photographs because Secretary of State William Rogers had been excluded from the meeting. Publicizing the presence of a comparatively junior National Security Council official would have further emphasized the extent to which Kissinger had displaced the State Department in the conduct of American foreign policy. Lord’s own account illustrates the extraordinary concentration of diplomatic authority within Nixon’s inner circle. Some of the most consequential negotiations undertaken by the United States were conducted by a handful of individuals operating outside the customary institutional channels.

The intelligence arrangements negotiated during Nixon’s visit were even more sensitive.

Henry Kissinger, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong during the American-Chinese rapprochement.
Henry Kissinger, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong during the American-Chinese rapprochement. Radio Free Asia, archival photograph

While the presidential delegation participated in banquets, ceremonial visits and public appearances, Kissinger met privately with Chinese military officials. He provided them with classified information concerning Soviet troop deployments, conventional military capabilities and strategic weapons positioned against China. The briefing was received by Marshal Ye Jianying.

The historical symmetry is remarkable. In December 1944, American intelligence personnel had traveled to Yan’an to discuss military cooperation with Ye against the Japanese. In February 1972, another American delegation was providing him with intelligence concerning the Soviet military. In each instance the two sides had identified a common adversary whose defeat or containment justified cooperation that would otherwise have been politically difficult.

The intelligence briefing was conducted with such secrecy that even much of the American intelligence establishment remained unaware that the information had been transmitted. Its significance became more widely understood following the release of documents examined by the National Security Archive in the early 2000s. The public relationship between the two governments continued to be characterized by ideological disagreements concerning Vietnam, Taiwan and American military involvement in Asia. Beneath those disagreements, an important strategic understanding was being established.

By November 1973, Kissinger was describing the relationship in remarkably explicit terms in a classified report to Nixon:

As I pointed out after my February 1973 trip, we have become tacit allies.

The phrase appears in the official diplomatic record of the United States. A relationship that much of the public still understood as an uneasy accommodation between ideological enemies was already being privately interpreted by America’s secretary of state as an informal alliance.

The Yale connection would become even more conspicuous during the administration of Nixon’s successor.

George and Barbara Bush with their bicycles in Beijing during his tenure as American liaison.
George and Barbara Bush with their bicycles in Beijing during his tenure as American liaison. South China Morning Post / archival photograph

In October 1974, George Herbert Walker Bush assumed leadership of the United States Liaison Office in Beijing. Bush was the son of Prescott Bush, a prominent investment banker associated with Brown Brothers Harriman and a former United States senator. Like his father, George Bush attended Yale and became a member of Skull and Bones.

Bush had already served as American ambassador to the United Nations and chairman of the Republican National Committee. His appointment to Beijing placed him at the center of the relationship Kissinger had established with the Chinese leadership. Although the United States and the People’s Republic had yet to establish formal diplomatic relations, the liaison office operated as a diplomatic mission. Behind its public functions, it also housed an American intelligence presence.

The CIA’s first station chief in Beijing was James Roderick Lilley.

James Roderick Lilley, Yale graduate, CIA officer and later American ambassador to China.
James Roderick Lilley, Yale graduate, CIA officer and later American ambassador to China. U.S. Department of State / Wikimedia Commons

Born in Qingdao in 1928, Lilley had grown up in China before attending Yale University. He entered the American intelligence service during the early years of the Cold War and spent much of his career working on Chinese affairs. Lilley established the CIA presence in Beijing in 1973 and continued serving there during Bush’s tenure. His position made him an important communications link between Washington and its new Chinese partners.

In 1976, Bush returned to the United States and became director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Lilley subsequently served under him in Washington as a senior intelligence officer specializing in East Asia. Years later, during Bush’s presidency, Lilley would return to China as American ambassador, occupying that position during the suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989.

The relationships between Bush, Lord and Lilley demonstrate how a relatively small circle of American specialists could retain influence across multiple administrations. The diplomatic opening initiated under Nixon was maintained by individuals whose careers extended through successive governments, intelligence agencies and private foreign policy institutions. Winston Lord himself eventually became American ambassador to China under Ronald Reagan, serving from 1985 to 1989.

Two acknowledged members of Skull and Bones and another Yale-trained intelligence specialist had consequently occupied important positions in establishing and administering the American relationship with Communist China. Their shared educational and social background does not establish that the rapprochement was directed by Skull and Bones. It does, however, provide a documented example of how the American upper-class recruitment system populated the institutions responsible for some of the most sensitive international relationships of the twentieth century.

Gerald Ford’s delegation, including Kissinger and Bush, meets Chinese officials in Beijing, December 1975.
Gerald Ford’s delegation, including Kissinger and Bush, meets Chinese officials in Beijing, December 1975. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library / Wikimedia Commons

On October 21, 1975, Kissinger, Bush and Lord attended a private meeting with Mao in Beijing. The conversation ranged across international affairs, American politics and the personal relationships developing between Chinese and American officials. Mao turned his attention toward Bush, questioning why the American representative had not visited him more frequently. When the subject of Bush’s political future arose, Mao suggested that Bush could become president of the United States. Kissinger entertained the possibility of a presidential candidacy in 1980.

Mao subsequently explained his peculiar preference for foreigners who criticized him:

If you don’t curse me, I won’t see you, and I will just sleep peacefully.

The exchange was recorded in the official memorandum of the meeting. It lends particular credibility to the recollection of Mao’s physician concerning his earlier observations about newspaper hostility. Mao understood that the ideological reputations of the individuals involved could be politically useful in establishing relationships that contradicted the expectations of their followers.

An American politician with an established anti-Communist identity could undertake negotiations with Communist China while retaining the appearance of ideological consistency. Mao similarly possessed sufficient revolutionary authority to establish relations with Western capitalists without surrendering his position within the Chinese Communist Party. The practical limits of this arrangement were negotiated in private. Its presentation to the public was managed through newspapers, television and carefully organized diplomatic spectacle.

By the time Bush and Lord were sitting with Mao in 1975, another influential American had already established a relationship with the Chinese government. His interests extended beyond the strategic problems of the Cold War into the economic and institutional development of the People’s Republic. His name was David Rockefeller.

David Rockefeller, whose 1973 visit established Chase Manhattan’s correspondent relationship with the Bank of China.
David Rockefeller, whose 1973 visit established Chase Manhattan’s correspondent relationship with the Bank of China. J.P. Morgan historical timeline

David Rockefeller’s journey to Beijing in June 1973 represented the return of a family whose involvement in Chinese development extended back more than half a century. His grandfather, John D. Rockefeller, had established the philanthropic institutions that initiated the family’s medical development program in China. His father had personally attended the dedication of Peking Union Medical College in 1921.

David arrived under significantly different circumstances. As chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank and the Council on Foreign Relations, he occupied a prominent position within the private American institutions concerned with international finance and foreign policy. His brother Nelson Rockefeller had also maintained a longstanding professional relationship with Henry Kissinger.

In 1956, Nelson had initiated the Rockefeller Brothers Fund’s Special Studies Project, an undertaking that assembled prominent figures from government, universities, industry and the military to examine the future direction of American national policy. Kissinger served as the project’s director and subsequently advised Nelson Rockefeller on foreign affairs. Before entering the Nixon administration, he had spent years operating within the intellectual and political environment surrounding the Rockefeller family.

Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and Nelson Rockefeller in the Oval Office, 1975.
Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and Nelson Rockefeller in the Oval Office, 1975. U.S. National Archives / Wikimedia Commons

The eventual appointment of Nelson Rockefeller as vice president under Gerald Ford completed an extraordinary convergence of political personalities. During the final years of Mao’s life, the American vice president was a Rockefeller, the secretary of state was a former Rockefeller adviser, the American diplomatic representative in Beijing was George Bush, and the Rockefeller banking interests had reopened financial relations with Communist China. These relationships were visible in the composition of the American government itself.

David Rockefeller’s visit established Chase Manhattan as the first American bank to enter a correspondent relationship with the Bank of China since the Communist revolution. The arrangement made it possible for Chase to facilitate international financial transactions involving the People’s Republic, including remittances, trade payments and letters of credit.

For a government preparing to import extensive quantities of Western industrial equipment, such services were materially significant. Chinese commercial agencies required methods of paying overseas suppliers, accessing foreign currencies and conducting transactions within the international banking system. Rockefeller had also established a banking presence in Moscow earlier in 1973. Within a remarkably short period, Chase Manhattan had extended its operations into relationships with the two principal Communist powers, even as their rivalry was producing one of the most dangerous military confrontations of the Cold War.

The ideological boundaries that divided governments represented business opportunities for international banking institutions capable of operating across those boundaries. Rockefeller’s ambitions in China extended considerably beyond banking.

A diplomatic cable transmitted by the American Liaison Office in Beijing on July 4, 1973, recorded discussions held during his visit on behalf of several private American institutions. Representing the Museum of Modern Art, Rockefeller brought Charlie Chaplin films to China and proposed an American photographic exhibition. On behalf of Rockefeller University, he invited Chinese acupuncture specialists to lecture and conduct demonstrations in New York.

His proposals for the Council on Foreign Relations included reciprocal visits by Chinese and American foreign policy leaders, annual conferences on bilateral relations, participation by Chinese diplomats in American seminars and the possible placement of Chinese foreign affairs specialists within the council’s resident scholar program. Rockefeller also met with Chinese international trade officials and spent approximately two hours in conversation with Zhou Enlai.

The diplomatic cable illustrates the breadth of the relationship he was attempting to establish. The proposed arrangements encompassed financial services, cultural exchange, scientific research, education and direct institutional contact between American and Chinese foreign policy establishments. In many respects, the proposals represented a modernized continuation of the private American engagement with China that had developed through universities, medical boards and philanthropic organizations earlier in the century. The institutions and methods had changed. The underlying importance of personal relationships, technical expertise and access to Chinese leadership remained.

The most controversial aspect of Rockefeller’s visit emerged following his return to the United States.

On August 10, 1973, The New York Times published an article by Rockefeller entitled From a China Traveler. In it, Rockefeller offered an extraordinarily favorable assessment of the Chinese revolutionary experience. His concluding characterization of Mao’s social experiment described it as:

One of the most important and successful in human history.

The statement has since become one of the most frequently cited examples of Western establishment enthusiasm for Maoist China. The original article is catalogued in the newspaper’s archive; the wording here comes from subsequent reproductions.

Mao Zedong among Red Guards and supporters at Tiananmen during the Cultural Revolution.
Mao Zedong among Red Guards and supporters at Tiananmen during the Cultural Revolution. Radio Free Asia, archival photograph

The historical context makes the statement particularly difficult to reconcile with the realities of Mao’s rule. The Great Leap Forward, initiated in 1958, had produced a catastrophic famine. Estimates vary, but tens of millions of Chinese citizens died as a consequence of a combination of forced collectivization, excessive grain procurement, concealed agricultural failures and political repression.

The Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, had subjected intellectuals, administrators, teachers, physicians and ordinary citizens to persecution, imprisonment, forced displacement and public humiliation. These developments were hardly incidental episodes in the economic and political transformation of China. They represented fundamental features of Mao’s attempt to reorganize Chinese society.

Rockefeller’s favorable assessment was published while the Cultural Revolution remained underway. His description largely reflected the achievements and social order presented to Western visitors by the Chinese government. The suffering underlying much of that transformation received considerably less attention.

The discrepancy is especially significant in light of the Rockefeller family’s historic investment in Chinese medicine, scientific education and public welfare. The institutions established through Rockefeller philanthropy had been designed to improve health and human living conditions, yet David Rockefeller was prepared to characterize a revolution associated with one of history’s most devastating famines in exceptionally favorable terms.

There was, however, an economic dimension to the diplomatic opening that would ultimately transform China more profoundly than many of the visitors understood.

The conventional history of China’s economic modernization begins with Deng Xiaoping and the reforms introduced after 1978. The collaboration between Chinese state institutions and Western industrial corporations actually began developing on a substantial scale during Mao’s lifetime.

In 1973, China authorized an industrial import initiative known as the Four-Three Program, named for its initial allocation of $4.3 billion. The program contemplated the acquisition of complete industrial facilities, equipment and technical knowledge from Japan, the United States and Western Europe. Twenty-six major industrial projects eventually emerged from the initiative, including facilities concerned with fertilizer production, synthetic fibers and other industrial necessities.

China’s agricultural difficulties had demonstrated the inadequacy of its existing industrial capacity. The leadership recognized the importance of modern fertilizer plants and production techniques that could increase food supplies without requiring further destructive attempts to reorganize the countryside. Western industrial technology offered a means of addressing some of these deficiencies.

The American Kellogg Company obtained contracts worth roughly $200 million involving eight fertilizer plants. American technical personnel traveled to China to assist with the installation of equipment and the development of local operations. China also purchased Boeing 707 aircraft, advanced aircraft engines and satellite communications equipment during the early years of the rapprochement. American machinery exports reached hundreds of millions of dollars before Mao’s death in 1976.

A CAAC Boeing 707. China’s acquisition of American aircraft began during the opening of the 1970s.
A CAAC Boeing 707. China’s acquisition of American aircraft began during the opening of the 1970s. Aviationtag, historical aviation photograph

The industrial assistance provided by the Soviet Union during the 1950s was now being supplemented and partially superseded by technology originating within the Western capitalist economies. The Chinese government’s ability to acquire that technology depended upon the diplomatic, commercial and financial relationships being established during the same period.

The significance of Chase Manhattan’s arrival in 1973 becomes clearer when placed within this wider economic development. Rockefeller was restoring access to American financial services precisely as the Chinese government was undertaking a multibillion-dollar industrial purchasing program. Chase was only one institution operating within this emerging system. Its documented correspondent banking relationship does not establish that Rockefeller personally financed or controlled the Four-Three Program. It does establish that his bank helped restore financial infrastructure through which the growing commercial relationship could operate.

By 1978, Chase was preparing further proposals to participate in the financing of China’s expanding modernization program. Other American banks had followed Rockefeller into the Chinese market, while petroleum, engineering and manufacturing corporations were examining opportunities in the People’s Republic.

Mao’s conversation with John Service in 1945 had anticipated some of the essential features of this arrangement. China needed advanced industrial equipment and external capital. The United States possessed manufacturing capabilities and financial institutions that could supply them. Both countries could derive economic advantages from the relationship. The political conditions necessary to implement that vision had taken nearly thirty years to develop.

Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter at the Sino-American signing ceremony, January 31, 1979.
Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter at the Sino-American signing ceremony, January 31, 1979. U.S. National Archives / Wikimedia Commons

On January 1, 1979, the United States and the People’s Republic of China formally established diplomatic relations. Later that month, Deng Xiaoping traveled to the United States, where he visited American industrial facilities and met government and business leaders.

Deng Xiaoping at Boeing’s manufacturing facility during his 1979 visit to the United States.
Deng Xiaoping at Boeing’s manufacturing facility during his 1979 visit to the United States. Associated Press via Cascade PBS

Deng inherited a relationship that already included diplomatic channels, intelligence contacts, banking arrangements, industrial contracts and scientific exchanges. His economic reforms enormously expanded the scope of these activities, creating the conditions under which foreign manufacturing investment and exports would transform the Chinese economy over the following decades.

The China Medical Board returned to mainland China in 1980, following an invitation from the Chinese government. The reopening of Rockefeller-affiliated medical programs provided a direct institutional continuation of a relationship established in 1914. Yale’s relationship with China also continued. The schools and medical institutions established through its early twentieth-century efforts survived in various forms, becoming part of China’s modern educational infrastructure.

In the decades after Mao’s death, American corporations increasingly transferred manufacturing operations, technical expertise and industrial production to China. American financial institutions facilitated international investment, while successive administrations encouraged the People’s Republic’s integration into the global economic system. The granting of permanent normal trade relations in 2000 and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 completed another major stage of this integration.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the economic prediction Mao had offered to John Service in 1945 had been realized to an extent that neither man could have anticipated. China had become an enormous market for international investment and a central producer of manufactured goods consumed throughout the United States. The prediction that the two economies would not compete, however, proved considerably less accurate.

The history of the American relationship with Communist China is often presented through a succession of ideological confrontations and diplomatic breakthroughs. Examined across a longer period, it also reveals the remarkable endurance of relationships maintained through private institutions, education, commerce and intelligence.

The Yale-affiliated medical premises occupied by the young Mao, the American guerrilla specialists received at Yan’an, the proposed meeting with Roosevelt, Edgar Snow’s return to China, Kissinger’s intelligence exchanges, the appointments of Winston Lord and George Bush, and David Rockefeller’s banking negotiations belong to different historical circumstances. Their connection lies in the ability of American institutions to establish relationships with Chinese political leadership through periods of apparent isolation and profound political change.

There remains no conclusive evidence that Mao was recruited by Yale, that Skull and Bones directed the Chinese Communist revolution or that a single American organization secretly administered the development of Communist China. Such a theory would also have to account for the genuine military conflict and covert hostility between the two governments during much of the Cold War. The documented relationships are substantial in their own right.

American military personnel considered equipping Mao’s guerrillas before the People’s Republic existed. American diplomats discussed industrial development with Mao before the Chinese Civil War had been resolved. American intelligence officials subsequently supplied his government with classified military information. American bankers established financial relationships with the People’s Republic while the Cultural Revolution continued, and American industrial corporations participated in its modernization before Deng Xiaoping came to power.

The American establishment contributed to the development of Communist China through a series of decisions made across generations, often for reasons of immediate military, political or commercial advantage. The Chinese leadership, for its part, repeatedly demonstrated an ability to exploit American resources and relationships without abandoning its own overriding ambition of national power.

In 1945, Mao explained to an American diplomat how the capital and industrial capabilities of the United States could be employed in the transformation of China. In 1972, he received an American president. In 1973, a Rockefeller returned to Beijing.

The revolution had survived its enemies, acquired their technology and secured their financial cooperation. Its leadership understood that yesterday’s adversary could become tomorrow’s indispensable partner.

All that remained was to determine how much they would have to curse each other in the newspapers.

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